Famine, the last act?

Radu Ionescu

Faculty of Geography, University of Bucharest
radu.ionescu@geo.unibuc.ro

Abstract. Dessalegn Rahmato contends that "Famine is the closing scene of a drama whose most important and decisive acts have been played out behind closed doors." This paper will critically analyse this statement and evaluate its implications for humanitarian response and intervention. The work is structured as follows. First it will look at different interpretations of famine. Next it looks at systems theory as a base for a framework that it will employ in the analyses. This framework is made up of three types of "doors": the governmental doors, the private doors and the NGO's doors. The paper will look behind these doors and see if the decisions taken there have indeed led to famine being the closing scene of a drama.

Keywords: *famine, transparency, state, private, NGOs*

1. INTRODUCTION

Authors define famine in various ways. For some (Svedberg, 1995) it is the extreme form of general endemic hunger. Traditionally, hunger, or under nourishment was the ratio between food intake and food requirements. Although useful, this ratio is debatable because the level of food requirements varies with age, sex, physical activity and climate. Famine does not have one unique set of characteristics. This lack of uniqueness is linked with the concept of entitlement which is "the set of alternative commodity bundles which a person can command" (Dreze *et al.*, 1995). Specific situations with a specific constellation of economic, political, cultural, and social relations determine this set of "alternative bundles" which in turn determine the likelihood famine. Sen's notion of entitlement seems quite similar to what other authors call resilience (Wisner *et al.* 2004; Cardona 2004). The fact that, in his view, the opposite of entitlement is "vulnerable groups" might further stress this argument. This variability of entitlement or resilience owing to complex economic, political, cultural, and social relations makes famine contextual and specific.

Keen (1994) also discusses this view (Dreze *et al*, 1995) according to which famine is the result of economic, political, cultural, and social relations. The author reveals the different interpretations of famine over the years. They range from the event interpretation; "a terrible event that descends on particular societies from time to time and yields a number of unfortunate victims" (Keen, 1994), to famine as a complex economic and political process.

Keen's (1994) contribution is that by holding this view of famine as a process he can also show that there are beneficiaries of famine. Focusing on the victims will only offer us a part of the picture. Famine is a process in which a section of the community gains and another losses. We later come revisit this idea. Another key point to be made about famine is the apparent paradox between how much food the world produces (i.e. enough to meet everyone's food nutritional needs) (Shaw, 2001) and the fact that there are countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where about 70 percent of the population is undernourished (GHI, 2011).

Here we find two of the points mentioned above that will further guide this analysis: (1) famine as the result of a constellation of economic, political, cultural, and social relations, and (2) famine as a process in which some stand to gain.

2. WHOSE DOORS?

One way of grouping the various actors that impact famine, in one way or another, is via the sector approach which categories the actors as being part of the public sector, the private sector, or the third sector (generally the NGOs). The boundaries between the sectors are sometimes quite blurry (Defourny, 2001) but even with this limitation they can still prove useful in this analysis for they will offer a wide image of who makes decisions that lead to hunger.

These sectors are not independent. The crucial aspect here is to understand how complex systems work. The central idea in complex systems theory is that everything is inter-connected with everything and that even minor variations in one of the subsystems can reverberate across the various linkages to other subsystems thereby making the entire system alter its state, sometimes in drastic, highly visible ways (Hillhorst, 2004). Therefore the governments', the companies' and the NGOs' decisions (even though they will be analyzed separately) are all inter-connected.

3. PUBLIC SECTOR, NOT SO PUBLIC

"Humanitarian crises do not exist! There are only political crises that have humanitarian consequences" (Vidal, 2001).

The impact of governmental or state decisions on the well-being of the populace is something that is constantly debated (Bricmont, 2006). This paper will now try to see if it can identify instances where the state has taken decisions behind closed doors that led to famine. The "closed doors" concept essentially means that the decisions were not taken after a transparent process of deliberation but were taken by a powerful few, usually in secret, and later imposed on the populace (Reltien, 2001).

States use hunger as a weapon. They do it internally, at the expense of their own population (Rubin, 2001), and they do it externally at the expense of other countries populations (Bricmont, 2006). There are a number of reasons why states would allow or even aid the process of famine unfold within their jurisdiction:

One is to save face, to show to the world that the state can manage and that it does not need help. When this is the case the state tries to conceal the famine through various means such as preventing the movements of populations and keeping them in a situation of internal displacement. "Famine denied is famine concealed" (Vidal, 2001). For examples of this kind of state logic one can look at North Korea (Reltien, 2001), DRC (Vidal, 2001), or Abkhazia (Sanchez-Montero, 2001).

Another is to disenfranchise certain ethnic/ political/social groups that are perceived as enemies. An example of this is the Serbian authorities' control of essential food and non-food items within Kosovo in the late '90s (Mason and Ogden, 2001).

One other reason why states allow famine to occur in their territories is a combination of ineffective policies. By far the worst example of this is the Great Chinese Famine of 1958-1961. Mao's desire to rapidly industrialize China through the Great Leap policies helped create this crisis but also caused delays in response owing to politically motivated exaggerations of local harvest size. The resulting famine killed between 15 and 30 million people depending on the source and quality of the statistics (Xizhe and Zhigang, 2000).

Denying famine to save face, disenfranchising certain groups or implementing ineffective policies are just some of the reasons (interconnected most of the times) why states allow or even encourage famine within their boundaries. For humanitarian interventions these governmental motivations pose a number of challenges. One of these challenges has to do with the fact that humanitarian intervention is ideally based on the principles of humanity, impartiality and independence (James, 2008). When the North Korean government accepts aid that it believes to be humanitarian (i.e. not subject of conditions which are interpreted as political) it puts a major constraint on humanitarian aid because it channels it through the state apparatus thereby making it lose its independence (Reltien, 2001).

States encourage famine in other states. Whenever power is exercised over others there needs to be a justifying ideology. "That justification almost always comes down to the same formula:

when a exercises power over B, he does so for B's own good." (Bricmont, 2006) Interventionist policies are labelled as humanitarian interventions. There are two divergent views regarding these so called humanitarian interventions. The first relies on a Kantian argument essentially arguing that it is a strict moral duty to intervene when fundamental human right are violated. In other words if one is recognised as a person, that demands that we respect this person as an autonomous source of value. This is a duty of justice (protecting the victims and coercing the wrongdoer) and not to be confused with a duty of charity. Failing to fulfill this duty (i.e. neutrality) is therefore morally culpable (Bagnoli, 2006). If one holds this view he or she can assert that military intervention by a country in another country is humanitarian intervention because some person's human rights were being violated in the latter.

However, if one looks at former (and current) interventions the human rights argument used to substantiate them seems to lose some of its strength. In 1979 Nicaragua, the Sandinistas came to power and abolished the death penalty, built two thousand schools, introduced free education and health services, reduced infant mortality by a third and eradicated Polio. This was a Marxist-Leninist subversion for the US who after relentless economic pressure and 30.000 dead finally brought democracy to the country (Bricmont, 2006). This "humanitarian imperialism" has started wars that have killed millions in Korea, Indochina, Central America, and Iraq. To the death toll one should also add the victims of the superpowers protégés: Pinochet, Suharto, Mobutu; the Brazilian, Argentinean, Guatemalan military regimes; and, the rebel groups in Angola and Mozambique (Bricmont, 2006).

More recently an epidemiological study (Roberts, 2006) found that about 100.000 excess deaths have happened since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The purposes of an army are to defend its country or to attack others. Neither of these aims is altruistic. An army's equipment, training and, above all, mindset are designed for these aims (Coleman, 2011). Yet "international political agendas are cloaked in humanitarian vocabulary" (Reltien, 2001).

Another way that states can intervene and create hunger within another state is through the use of embargoes. Embargoes are the prohibition of imports and exports from and to another country. Article 41 of the United Nations Charter recognises them as an international sanction. The flaw is in the very essence of an embargo: it uses economic constraints that cause human suffering for political objectives. This hardly ever works because the regimes chosen for destabilisation are usually strong ones that weren't responsive to popular opinion even before the embargo started. The disrupted economy that it creates is dominated by criminals and the black market which also destabilizes civil society so the popular revolt that was hopped for becomes less likely. So if embargoes do not bring about political change and cause massive human suffering why use them? The usefulness of these sanctions seems to lie not in what they can achieve abroad but what can they achieve at home. It is the message that matters. Embargoes are therefore a symbolic condemnation used for domestic political ends (Coti and Wipff, 2001).

It seems then that states encourage famine in other states under the auspices of humanitarian intervention. This poses a number of issues for the second wave of humanitarian intervention, that of the NGOs. The scenarios are infinitely complex but for the purpose of this paper only the implications of military intervention and embargoes addressed earlier will be discussed in relation to NGO humanitarian intervention.

Military intervention impacts the NGOs in two distinct ways. The first is that it forces the NGOs to make a choice regarding how much they are willing to cooperate with the armed forces. Here organisations can be placed on a continuum, from organisations that actively collaborate with the occupying forces to ones that value neutrality but may consider accepting limited assistance to the ones that consider even limited interactions as a threat to their neutrality (James, 2008). The second impact is that military intervention creates a very dangerous work environment for the humanitarian worker because of the perceived association between him and the attacker.

Embargoes put pressure on NGOs intervention from both sides. First because they have to apply for

permission to the sanctions committees (which are overwhelmed with applications) and they can only get a limited number of supplies that are essential for the population's survival. Secondly, and perhaps more important, is that the regime in the embargoed country is likely to be granted monopoly over the distribution of the food items. This further empowers them and represses their opponents who now have to spend their energies in trying to survive (Coti and Wipff, 2001). An example of using food supply for political reasons on a massive scale is the Ukrainian Holomdor of 1929-1933 which killed a minimum of 2.2 million persons (Mesle *et al*, 2005).

This paper has so far looked at how decisions taken by the state lead to famine. The desire to save face or to disenfranchise certain ethnic/political/ social groups, bad policies or any combination of these factors (and many others that owing to word count constraints are not discussed) can create famine within the country. Military intervention justified with humanitarian arguments and branded as such, as well as embargoes, are another group of governmental decisions that create famine, this time, in another country. Again, any combination of factors/decisions is possible; the important issue is that the hungry did not have a saying in any of these instances.

4. MAXIMISING PROFITS

The paper will now look at the second sector (the businesses or the for-profit organisations) and how decisions made behind this sectors' closed doors have led to famine and suffering. It will also examine how this impacts humanitarian intervention. Unlike political decisions that have numerous inter-connected reasons behind them the decisions made by for-profit organisations have a central, built-in motivation: money. So instead of discussing the motives (as was partially done above) the paper will now focus on the ways in which for-profits can benefit from famine.

The first way of profiting is by using violence induced famine to drive out large populations from a certain area in order to gain control of that land. Land can be valuable in itself (arable land), because of mineral deposits (Sierra Leone) (Lefort, 2001) or

oil deposits (South Sudan) (Keen, 1994) or any other resources. Support for the creation of famine on the part of large corporations looking to secure their rights of exploitation has been widely alleged. An inferential argument could be made by looking at Angola. When Jonas Savimbi, leader of the rebel movement for 27 years died (public opinion regarded this as the end of the conflict there) the stock markets reacted negatively. After the cease-fire there was "a significant decrease in the returns of diamond mining companies operating in Angola" (Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2005). In other words the markets correctly knew that peace would reduce profits.

Farmers in powerful countries also benefit from famine in another country. The farmers put pressure on their government. The government uses its power within the World Trade Organisation, the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank and penalises farming subsidies in another country. Food is then imported from the powerful country in the form of tax-exempt food aid (Sanchez-Montero, 2001).

Creating, or simply declaring a famine gives the powerful few in that country access to the distribution of food aid that they know will come (IFRCRC, 2003). In 1998, Gennady Kulik, then Russian vice-prime minister of agriculture, negotiated food aid with the European Commission and the US. Soon after the preliminary agreement with the US, Kulik announced that one of his known associates' firm will act as intermediary thereby receiving a 3 percent commission (Littell, 2001).

Famine facilitates slave trade and ownership. The link is not causal but supportive. Two scenarios are common, the first more than the second. The first is where famine brings desperation and makes the affected take on supposedly paid jobs far away from their village. They depart with people they have never seen before and do not know where they are going. Once they get there, they are informed that if they try to leave they will be killed or tortured. They are now slaves (Bales, 2010). The second scenario is one in which famine pushes populations; it displaces them, making them more vulnerable in the face of captors. In the late 80s in Sudan almost every household fleeing the south had had one family member captured (Keen, 1994).

There are about 27 million slaves in the world today. The price of a human being has averaged 40.000 adjusted dollars in the last 4000 years. Today the average price around the world is 90 dollars. The 27 million generate about 40 billion dollars every year in to the global economy (Bales, 2010). The people making this money have no interest in alleviating famine as this supplies them with cheap human beings.

Another way, in which famine can make a profit for some, is by allowing these to "force the market" (Keen, 1994). What this means is that if a population has some material assets (e.g. livestock), it is forced to sell these at incredibly low prices compared to pre-famine prices. The buyers gain capital and when the next famine happens they are in an even better position to control the market. The affected become more vulnerable not only because they now have less livestock but also because they have lost social capital (i.e. it is harder for them to borrow from neighbours or friends because the latter know the chances of repayment are slim) (Keen, 1994).

So far this paper has examined five ways in which for-profit organisations can gain through hunger. Drive out populations to secure access to resources. Export food disguised as food aid. Be in charge of food aid distribution. Buy or steal human beings and turn them in to slaves. Force the market so that the hungry sell their assets cheaply.

Two points could be made at this time. First, these decisions are not disparate. The methods might differ but the goal is the same: use famine to make money. Second, these decisions do not happen in a vacuum, they are taken in collaboration with first sector actors (people in political power).

The degree of collaboration varies from bribing the local police chief to financing political campaigns (Baye *et al.*, 1993; Austen-Smith and Wright, 1994).

5. NGOS ALSO HAVE DOORS

In very simple terms the humanitarian organisations receive money or other resources from donors and then use these to aid their beneficiaries. Two potential issues can be observed when analysing this system, both of which have power at their centre.

The first potential issue is corruption as defined by Transparency International (2010): "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain". Focusing only on corrupt politicians and businessman makes us forget that NGOs receive and spend considerable amounts of money under very light regulations (when compared to their first and second sector counterparts) (Trivunovic, 2011). Corruption undermines the programmes' objectives by diverting funds or through abuse of power. Corruption also leads to an overall decrease in support for aid in general and makes the donor agency lose some of its authority in the face of government partners that it wants to convince to implement anti-corruption mechanisms (Trivunovic *et al.*, 2011). All of these effects reverberate and make hunger reduction less likely. The private gain does not necessarily need to be financial. A report commissioned by UNHCR and Save the Children UK concerning West Africa refugees in 2001 contained "allegations against 40 agencies and 67 individuals, with evidence of extensive sexual exploitation, mostly involving locally employed humanitarian staff trading relief items for sex with girls under 18" (Transparency International, 2010).

The implications for humanitarian organisations are extensive. One way of visualising them is through the alternative responses, or options, that these organisations have available: reputational risk vs. open discussion, too many vs. too few controls, urgency vs. prudence, pressure to spend vs. getting things right, local empowerment vs. standardised procedures and controls, inclusion vs. exclusion targeting errors, transparency vs. staff and aid recipient security, information-sharing vs. legal and liability issues (Transparency International, 2010).

The second potential issue is donor pressure, or power, and the NGO behaviour it generates. Two points can be highlighted. First, the liberal view is that the more NGOs there are the more robust civil society is (Mercer, 2002). The issue with this is that having more NGOs in one sector (e.g. food aid) also increases uncertainty, competition and insecurity for all the organisations in that sector. Second, the use of competitive tenders and renewable contracts creates incentives for NGOs to act more like firms (Heggstad and Frøystad, 2011). In Kyrgyzstan, contracting INGOs relying on one-year renewable contracts

downplayed government subversion of economic reforms, tolerated bureaucratic opportunism, and withheld information about ineffective projects (Cooley and Ron, 2002). This is not about normative agendas or morality it is about dysfunctional organisational behaviour as a rational response to institutional pressures.

6. CONCLUSIONS

By looking at famine as the result of a constellation of economic, political, cultural, and social relations, as well as a process in which some stand to gain this paper has analysed Dessalegn Rahmato's assertion: "Famine is the closing scene of a drama whose most important and decisive acts have been played out behind closed doors."

Some governmental decisions, made behind closed doors for political/economic gain, impact famine within that country as well as in other countries. Denning famine, disenfranchising groups, bad policies, military intervention, and embargoes all seem to be decisive acts that lead to famine.

For-profit organisations sometimes make decisions that benefit them at the expense of the vulnerable and poor. From violence used to secure access to resources to more complicate schemes involving organisations such as the World Bank, an organisation that has only had American presidents (Worldbank, 2012), for-profits engage in actions that appear to play a decisive role in the existence of famine.

Some third sector organisations abuse their entrusted power for private gain at the expense of their beneficiaries as well as the expense of other organisations who now find it harder to attract donors. Finding donors was hard to start with and the result of this competition is a dysfunctional organisational behaviour that focuses on the organisations' well-being as opposed to that of the beneficiaries. Corruption and withholding information about projects effectiveness, inter alia, are important acts that seem to make stopping famine harder.

All of the decisions discussed so far happened "behind closed doors" (i.e. not taken after a transparent process of deliberation but taken by a powerful few, usually in secret, and later imposed on the populace). All of them have worked against the vulnerable and hungry. It would seem that for the most part Dessalegn Rahmato's assertion is correct.

From the point of view of the person that has just died of hunger, famine is undoubtedly the closing scene and Rahmato illustrates that with sensibility from this author's perspective. From a wider point of view, however, the "closing scene" construct is debatable. If one links Keen's (1994) and Hillhorst's (2004) views mentioned in the beginning of this paper according to which famine is a complex economic and political process on the one hand and that systems have highly complex linkages that allow for minor variations to alter the system on the other it becomes hard to justify why famine is the "closing scene" as opposed to a process interconnected with other processes all of which are ongoing and constantly changing state. Although using a theatre play as an analogy is revealing in that it illustrates how previous actions have created the potential for the closing scene it is limited because after the closing scene there is nothing. The actors are applauded and they go home.

As discussed in this paper famine changes the power structure by making the vulnerable more vulnerable and the rich and/or powerful few more rich and/or powerful. From a systems thinking point of view this change should reverberate across the system with potentially massive effects for all subsystems (countries, companies, people, environment, NGOs, etc.) Seen like this, famine therefore becomes another act in a larger play which has yet to finish.

References

Austen-Smith, D. and Wright, J.R. (1994). 'Counteractive Lobbying', American Journal of Political Science. 38(1), pp. 25-44.

Bagnoli, C. (2006). Humanitarian Intervention as a Perfect Duty: A Kantian Argument, in Nardin, T. and Williams, M.S. (2006) Humanitarian Intervention, New York University Press.

Bales, K. (2010). How To Combat Modern Slavery, Lecture at Ted2010, [Online]. Available at: http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/en/kevin_bales_how_to_combat_modern_slavery.html (Accessed 23 March 2012).

Bankoff, G., Frerks, G. and Hilhorst, D. (2004). Mapping vulnerability: Disaster, Development & People. Earthscan London.

Baye, M. R., Kovenock, D. and de Vries, C. G. (1993). 'Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Aplication of the All-Pay Auction', The American Economic Review. 83(1), pp. 289-94.

Bricmont, J. (2006). Humanitarian Imperialism. Using Human Rights to Sell War. Monthly Review Press, New York.

Brunel, S. (2001). Are There Still Natural Famines? , in The Geopolitics of Hunger 2000-2001 Hunger and Power, Action Against Hunger, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Cardona, O. D. (2004). The Need for Rethinking the Concepts of Vulnerability and Risk From a Holistic Perspective: A Necessary Review and Criticism for Effective Risk Management, in Wisner, B., Blaikie, P., Cannon, T. and Davis, I. (2004) At Risk: Natural Hazards, People's Vulnerability and Disasters, 2nd edition, Routledge London.

Coleman, S. (2011). The Moral Dangers of Non-Lethal Weapons, Lecture at TEDxCanberra, [Online]. Available at: http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/en/ stephen_coleman_the_moral_dangers_of_non_lethal_ weapons.html (Accessed 23 March 2012)

Cooley, A. and Ron, J. (2002). 'The NGO Scramble Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action', International Security, 27(1) pp. 5-39.

Coti, R. and Wipff, A. L. (2001). Why Embargoes?, in The Geopolitics of Hunger 2000-2001 Hunger and Power, Action Against Hunger, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Defourny, J. (2001). From Third Sector to Social Enterprise, in Borzaga, C. and Defourny, J. (2001), The Emergence of Social Enterprise, Routledge.

Dreze, J., Sen, A., and Hussain, A. (1995). The Political Economy of Hunger. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Drouart, E. (2001). Honduras: Supplying Water to Victims of Hurricane Mitch, in The Geopolitics of Hunger 2000-2001 Hunger and Power, Action Against Hunger, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Global Hunger Index (2011). Global Hunger Index 2011, Welthungerhilfe, International Food Policy Research Institute, Concern Worldwide.

Guidolin, M. and La Ferrara, E. (2005). 'Diamonds Are Forever, Wars Are Not. Is Conflict Bad for Private Firms?', Research Division Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

Hilhorst, D. (2004). Complexity and Diversity: Unlocking Social Domains of Disaster Response, in Bankoff, G., Frerks, G. and Hilhorst, D. (2004) Mapping vulnerability: Disaster, Development & People. Earthscan London.

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent (2003). World Disaster Report 2003. Geneva: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

James, E. (2008). Managing Humanitarian Relief an Operational Guide for NGOs, Practical Action Publishing.

Keen, D. (1994). The Benefits of Famine. A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan, 1983-1989, Princeton University Press.

Lefort, P. (2001). Sierra Leone: Food at the Heart of the Conflict, in The Geopolitics of Hunger 2000-2001 Hunger and Power, Action Against Hunger, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Littell, J. (2001). Food Aid to Russia: Welcome or Unwelcome, in The Geopolitics of Hunger 2000-2001 Hunger and Power, Action Against Hunger, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Mercer, C. (2002). 'NGOs, civil society and democratization: a critical review of the literature', Progress in Development Studies, 2(5), pp. 5-22.

Mesle, F., Pison, G., and Vallin, J. (2005). 'France-Ukraine: Demographic Twins Separated by History', Population and Societies, 413, pp. 1-4.

Mason, F. and Ogden, K. (2001). The Tragedy of Kosovo, in The Geopolitics of Hunger 2000-2001 Hunger and Power, Action Against Hunger, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Pinon, J. P. (2001). Nicaragua: No Way Out of Rural Poverty?, in The Geopolitics of Hunger 2000-2001 Hunger and Power, Action Against Hunger, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Reltien, C. (2001). Humanitarian Action in Notrh Koreea: Osatrich Politics, in The Geopolitics of Hunger 2000-2001 Hunger and Power, Action Against Hunger, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Roberts, L., Doocy, S., Lafta, R., and Burnham, G. (2006). 'Mortality after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: a cross-sectional cluster sample survey', The Lancet, 368(9545), pp. 1421-1428.

Rubin, B. R. (2001). Hunger and the New Humanitarianism, in The Geopolitics of Hunger 2000-2001 Hunger and Power, Action Against Hunger, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Sanchez-Montero, M. (2001). The Conflict in Abkhazia, in The Geopolitics of Hunger 2000-2001 Hunger and Power, Action Against Hunger, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Shaw, D. J. (2001). The UN World Food Programme and the Development of Food Aid, Palgrave.

Svedberg, P. (1995). Undernutrition in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Critical Assessment of the Evidence, in Dreze, J., Sen, A., and Hussain, A. (1995) The Political Economy of Hunger. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Transparency International (2010). Preventing Corruption in Humanitarian Operations, Global Programmes Transparency International.

Vidal, J. F. (2001). The Great Lakes: Avoiding an Ethnic Reading, in The Geopolitics of Hunger 2000-2001 Hunger and Power, Action Against Hunger, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Wisner, B., Blaikie, P., Cannon, T. and Davis, I. (2004). At Risk: Natural Hazards, People's Vulnerability and Disasters, 2nd edition, Routledge London.

Weiss, T.G. (2007). Humanitarian Intervention, Polity Press.

Xizhe, P. and Zhigang, G. (2000). The Changing Population of China, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford.

GeoPatterns